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Newspaper-Broadcast Combinations in the Same 
Community: How Much Divestiture for the Sake of 
Diversity? 
When profit potential from broadcasting was minimal or 
nonexistent, the Federal Communications Commission1 urged 
newspaper owners to pioneer the development of the indus- 
try-first in radio, then in television. Although the FCC generally 
favored diversity of ownership, there were few competent appli- 
cants for the airwaves, and newspapers provided strong journalis- 
tic traditions for the newly developing te~hnology.~ Since then the 
Commission's policy favoring diversified ownership has never 
barred the granting or renewal of broadcast licenses to newspaper 
owners in the same community if the overall public interest is 
~ e r v e d . ~  
In 1944 the FCC first proposed a rule to restrict cross- 
ownership of newspapers and radio stations in the same com- 
munity to promote diversity of ownership. The Commission, how- 
ever, ultimately decided that because of the "grave legal and 
policy questions involved," it would continue to resolve cross- 
ownership problems on a case-by-case basise4 Ad hoc considera- 
tion continued until 1970, when because of the rapid development 
and maturity that broadcasting had experienced, the FCC again 
initiated rulemaking proceedings to consider whether one party 
should be permitted to own or control both a broadcast station 
and a daily newspaper in the same c ~ m m u n i t y . ~  From these pro- 
ceedings and as part of an ongoing concern with concentrated 
media contr01,~ the Commission proposed a ban of all newspaper- 
1. Hereinafter referred to as "Commission" or "FCC." 
2. Amendment of Sections 73.35,73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relat- 
ing to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second 
Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1074-75 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Second Report 
and Order]; BROADCASTING, Aug. 5, 1974, a t  23-26. 
3. See text accompanying notes 57-64 infra. 
4. Newspaper Ownership of Radio Station (Notice of Dismissal of Proceeding), 9 Fed. 
Reg. 702, 703 (1944). 
5. Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relat- 
ing to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Further 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970). The proposed rule required 
divestiture within five years and prohibited future acquisitions of broadcast outlets in 
order to limit one party's holding in any market to one or more daily newspapers, one 
television station, or one AM-FM combination. Id. at  346. 
6. The FCC first initiated rules to combat media concentration by prohibiting one 
party from owning more than one FM radio station in the same area. This rule operated 
prospectively only. Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 5 
Fed. Reg. 2382,2384 (1940). Later the FCC likewise prohibited future common ownership 
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broadcast cross-ownership in a common city of operation. Over 
200 formal comments and 25 major studies were filed in response.' 
Following a five-year period of evidentiary consideration, the 
FCC issued less restrictive rules8 preserving the overwhelming 
majority of existing newspaper-broadcast combinations in the 
same community (commonly referred to as "grandfathering"),Y 
requiring divestiture within five years of combinations in com- 
munities served by only one daily newspaper and one broadcast 
station,1° and prohibiting the future formation or transfer of own- 
ership of any co-located newspaper-broadcast combination.ll 
of two or more VHF-TV stations in the same community. Rules and Regulations Govern- 
ing Commercial Television Broadcast Stations, 6 Fed. Reg. 2282, 2284-85 (1941). When 
the FCC prohibited one party from owning or controlling two or more AM stations in the 
same community, Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16065 
(EM),  approximately 20 owners were required to divest when on a case-by-case basis their 
ownerships were found to be anticompetitive. 11 FCC ANN. REP. 12 (1946). 
In 1968 first notice was given of proposed rules limiting the common ownership of 
different broadcast services within the same market, e.g., restricting one party's ownership 
of a radio station and television station in the same community. Standard, FM and 
Television Stations, Multiple Ownership, 33 Fed. Reg. 5315 (1968). The FCC ultimately 
prohibited only prospectively the cross-ownership of VHF-TV and radio stations in the 
same market and permitted AM-FM combinations. Amendment of Sections 73.35,73.240 
and 73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, 
and Television Broadcast Stations, First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970) 
[hereinafter cited as First Report and Order]. 
See text accompanying notes 77-80 infra for restrictions on cable ownership. 
7. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1090-94. The parties represented a 
broad spectrum of interests including combination owners, other broadcasters, and public 
interest groups. 
8. Multiple Ownership, 47 C.F.R. $ 0  73.35, .240, .636 (1977). 
9. Under the FCC's ruling, divestiture was ordered for 7 of 79 television-newspaper 
combinations in the same community. Thus 72 television-newspaper cross-ownerships 
were left intact. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938,946 n.18 
(D.C. Cir.), aff 'd in part and rev'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). Divestiture was ordered 
for 16 of approximately 250 radio-newspaper combinations. Id. See [I9771 BROADCASTING 
Y .B. A-45-49. 
10. A station is considered to serve a community by encompassing the community 
with a city-grade signal. A city-grade signal, the most intense under the FCC rules, 
provides a clear signal to the entire community to which the station is licensed. 
In order to understand the Commission's ruling, several other terms should be under- 
stood. "The word 'control' . . . is not limited to majority stock ownership, but includes 
actual working control in whatever manner exercised." 47 C.F.R. 5 73.636 n.1 (1977). 
"Community" or "market" is defined by wave reach. See note 11 infra. "[A] daily 
newspaper is one which is published four or more days per week, which is in the English 
language and which is circulated generally in the community of publication." 47 C.F.R. 
!$ 73.636 n.lO. Noncommercial television stations and college newspapers are not subject 
to divestiture, and their presence in a community does not exempt co-located monopolies 
from the rules. 47 C.F.R. $ 73.636(b) & n.lO. 
11. No newspaper-broadcast combination can be transferred in whole except by in- 
heritance. A daily newspaper cannot be issued a broadcast license in the same community; 
if a broadcast licensee acquires a newspaper in the same city, it must divest itself of the 
station within one year. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1074-76,1099-107. This 
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Thus, in spite of its policy favoring diversity of media ownership, 
the Commission required divestiture in only the "most egregious 
cases." Breakup was not ordered in markets containing more 
than one daily newspaper and broadcast station because the con- 
cern for potential disruption to public service from divestiture 
outweighed the need for diversity in such markets.12 Had the 
record before the FCC revealed evidence of misuse or harm aris- 
ing from cross-ownership in communities other than those served 
by only one daily newspaper and one broadcast station, the Com- 
mission may have required more divestiture.13 
The National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, the Jus- 
tice Department, the National Association of Broadcasters, the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association, and other media 
interests14 petitioned the D.C. Circuit challenging the FCC 
provision prohibits the formation or transfer of a combination if the only television station 
places a "grade A signal" over the city in which only one newspaper is published. A grade 
A signal is one that transmits a good picture 90% of the time a t  the best 70% of receiver 
locations. Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 515 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1955). A 
grade A signal is weaker than a city-grade signal. See Second Report and Order, supra 
note 2, a t  1075; W. GORMLEY, THE EFFECTS OF NEWSPAPER-TELEVISION CROSS-OWNERSHIP ON 
NEWS HOMOGENEITY 206 n.1 (1976). By defining a market in a particular way, the FCC 
can constrict or expand the effect of its multiple ownership order. The number of stations 
in a market increases if stations are defined by a grade A signal rather than by a city- 
grade signal. Thus, because the Commission's prohibition of future combinations defines 
the market by a grade A signal, rather than by a city-grade signal as required by the 
divestiture rules, fewer cities are likely to harbor media monopolies under the prospective 
rules. Although the Commission had been urged to employ grade A signals in determining 
the number of media outlets in a market for purposes of breaking up existing combina- 
tions, it chose to use the city standard because only a station encompassing a community 
with a city-grade signal could provide an "additional voice" on local matters. Second 
Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1082. 
12. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1080. ''[Yhe existence of a city grade 
television station is sufficient to exempt a radio combination from divestiture, but the 
existence of a city grade radio station does not exempt a television combination." National 
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 946 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd 
in part and reo'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). The difference is attributable to television's 
more powerful impact. Id. 
13. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1089. In addition, the Commission 
decided against granting a hearing in renewal application situations involving petitions 
to deny based on cross-ownership unless there is a showing of economic monopolization 
that may warrant actions under the Sherman Act. Id. a t  1088. For a description of what 
may be required under the Sherman Act, see note 169 infra. The FCC deferred decision 
on the weight to be given the cross-ownership factor in license renewal hearings involving 
competing applicants for the same licenses. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  
1088. 
14. Two radio stations filed briefs-SJAB, Inc. and Owosso Broadcasting, Inc. Inter- 
venor briefs included the Washington Post Co. and KSL, Inc. The Brockway Co., Gray 
Communications Systems, Inc., and the Daily Telegraph Printing Co. also submitted 
briefs for the court's consideration. 
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rules.'Vome of the petitioners contended the Commission arbi- 
trarily exceeded its authority by issuing the prospective ban and 
limited breakup order without individual hearings.lWthers 
argued that the FCC should have required across-the-board di- 
vestiture consistent with the "paramount public interest in diver- 
sification of media control."17 The Court of Appeals for the Dis- 
trict of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Commission's prospective 
ban on the formation and transfer of newspaper-broadcast combi- 
nations, but vacated the provision grandfathering existing combi- 
nations and instead required the Commission to adopt a rule 
compelling divestiture in all cases of newspaper-broadcast cross- 
ownership in the same market, even if other independently owned 
newspapers or broadcast stations existed in the area? The court's 
decision gave "diversity of media ownership controlling weight," 
even though abuses from common ownership were not estab- 
lished.lg 
The Supreme Court of the United States in FCC v. National 
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB)20 consolidated six 
petitions2' appealing the D.C. Circuit's decision on various 
grounds. Essentially sustaining the FCC's limited divestiture 
15. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), 
aff 'd in part and reu'd i n  part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). An appeal from an FCC rule may be 
taken to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 
5 402(b) (1970). 
16. E.g., Brief for Petitioner American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n a t  53, National 
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and 
rev'd i n  part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). 
17. E.g., Brief for Petitioner National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting a t  70, Na- 
tional Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in 
part and rev 'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). 
18. 555 F.2d a t  966 & n.112. Although the court of appeals did not affirm the Commis- 
sion's order, the Commission's waiver requirements were approved. Temporary or perma- 
nent waivers from the ban would be granted after a hearing showing that the rules' 
purposes would be better served by continuation of the combination, or that sale of half 
of the combination would be impossible or possible only a t  an artificially depressed price. 
Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1085. 
19. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 967, 969 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). This statement was made by the court in response to an FCC motion for stay of 
mandate. The Commission sought the stay in order to allow the Supreme Court to con- 
sider the Commission's petition for a writ of certiorari. The court stayed its order requiring 
the FCC to mandate divestiture of all co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations, but 
did not stay the Commission's prospective ban. Id. at  970. 
20. 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). 
21. The six actions consolidated for review were FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for 
Broadcasting, Channel Two Television Co. v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 
National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. National 
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, Illinois Broadcasting Co. v. National Citizens Comm. 
for Broadcasting, and Post Co. v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting. 
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order and prospective ban of co-located cross-ownership,22 the 
Court found the D.C. Circuit had improperly elevated the signifi- 
cance of ownership diversity above other public interest factors. 
This Comment will detail the Supreme Court's discussion of 
diversity of ownership and other public interest factors impacting 
on proper regulation of cross-owned newspaper and broadcast 
media. After examining the relative importance of various com- 
peting policies, a balance will be recommended from which cross- 
ownership can be most effectively regulated in contemplation of 
the overall public interest. 
A. FCC Regulation--The Public Interest Standard 
"Before 1927, the allocation of [broadcast] frequencies was 
left entirely to the private sector, and the result was chaos."2% 
response to this problem Congress enacted the Communications 
Act of 1934,24 establishing and empowering the Federal Commu- 
nications Commission to regulate the broadcast media in the 
"public interest, convenience and necessity"25 and to "encourage 
the larger and more effective use of radio."26 The broad and flexi- 
ble term "public interest" permeates the Communications Act, 
and is the general principle under which a multitude of FCC 
policies are subsumed, including those marshalling for and 
against preserving media ownership con~entra t ion.~~ In particu- 
lar, the Commission's power to make rules forbidding the future 
formation or transfer of commonly owned newspapers and broad- 
cast stations in the same community stems from its duties to 
determine eligibility standards in allocating broadcast frequen- 
cies and to enact rules preventing media concentration abuses.2x 
22. The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit's judgment upholding the Commis- 
sion's prospective ban of newspaper-broadcast combinations in the same community, but 
reversed the judgment vacating the Commission's limited divestiture order. 98 S. Ct. a t  
2111. 
23. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969). 
24. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. $ 5  151-609 (1970)). 
25. 47 U.S.C. 4 309(a)(1970). 
26. Id. $ 303(g). 
27. See National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d a t  947-49; Sec- 
ond Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1048. 
28. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d a t  947-48; see FCC 
v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. a t  2111. 
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1. T h e  standard for judicial review 
Before evaluating the precedent and reasoning surrounding 
the diversification issue, the standard for judicial review of ad- 
ministrative rulemaking must be considered in order to assess the 
weight that should be accorded the Commission's judgment. By 
providing the FCC with the broad and versatile public interest 
standard, Congress has allowed the Commission to consider 
"rapidly fluctuating factors" underlying the law and to establish 
rules as the broadcasting field evolves.2g "By specialization, by 
insight gained through experience, and by more flexible proce- 
d~re,"~O the Commission can more adeptly weigh the policy fac- 
tors of the public interest than any court. For these reasons the 
Commission has been granted broad power to enact regulations 
in furtherance of the public in tere~t .~ '  Its policy determinations 
constitute the very "area where administrative judgments are 
entitled to the greatest amount of weight by the appellate 
Therefore, serious doubt exists concerning the power of 
a court to supplant the FCC's assessment of public interest fac- 
tors with "one more nearly to its liking."33 
A reviewing court may not reverse the Commission unless it 
finds that the FCC rulemaking is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."34 An ad- 
ministrative regulation may be set aside as arbitrary or capricious 
only if the agency failed to make a "reasoned consideration [ofJ 
each of the pertinent factors,"35 and thus committed a clear error 
of judgment.36 Thus a court may reverse the FCC only if i t  finds 
29. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138, 142-43 (1940). See Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (quoting NBC v. United States, 
319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943)), in which the Court stated that the FCC's mandate "to assure 
that broadcasters operate in the public interest is a broad one, a power 'not niggardly but 
expansive .' " 
30. FCC v. RCA Broadcasting, Inc., 346 U.S. 86,96 (1953), (quoting Far East Confer- 
ence v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1950)). 
31. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943); see AT&T v. United States, 299 
U.S. 232, 236-37 (1936). 
32. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947). 
33. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968). 
34. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). 
35. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,792 (1968); see Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 
34-35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
36. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 
(1974) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971)). 
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969), in which the Supreme 
Court noted that it is a "venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those 
charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that 
it is wrong." 
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that there is no reasonable relationship between the public inter- 
est factors and the Commission's decision. 
2. Public interest and the first amendment 
The public interest sometimes requires that the government 
deny an individual a broadcast license because broadcast spec- 
trum space is scarce.37 The Supreme Court has affirmed the Com- 
mission's ruling that the public's interest in obtaining the opti- 
mal use of its limited airwaves is greater than the media's right 
to freedom from government interference." Although normally 
the first amendment is interpreted to prohibit government intru- 
sion on free expre~s ion ,~~  recent decisions indicate that the Su- 
preme Court continues to adhere to this "scarcity" rationale to  
justify affirmative government regulation of br~adcasting.~" 
The NCCB Court cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. u. FCC4' 
and noted that the scarcity argument justifies government re- 
strictions in spite of the first amendment." Although there is no 
express statutory language permitting the FCC to restrict news- 
paper publishers from owning broadcast stations," the Court 
noted that it is appropriate for the FCC to make extensive rules 
to codify its understanding of the public interest, especially to 
restrict increasing media c~ncentra t ion.~~ In the Court's view, the 
first amendment right to free speech is not abridged since the 
37. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,226 (1943): "But Congress did not authorize 
the Commission to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic 
or social views, or upon any other capricious basis." 
38. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-90 (1969). 
39. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Inter- 
est Standards of the communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 3 (1974). 
40. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). 
41. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
42. 98 S. Ct. a t  2114. Interestingly, Chief Judge Bazelon in writing for the D.C. 
Circuit expressed his own view that because of new technology, including cable television, 
the scarcity argument may be lost. If so, "[a]lleviating scarcity would not only eliminate 
the need for promoting diversity, it would also presumably eliminate the need for all 
licensing save that necessary to prevent interference. . . . Broadcasting would no longer 
present unique problems requiring unique regulation." 555 F.2d at  950 n.31. See B. OWEN, 
ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 107 (1975), reviewed by Posner, 86 YALE L.J. 567 
(1977); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 
223. See generally R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION 7 (1972); BROADCASTING, July 19, 1976, a t  
44. 
43. In light of this lack of explicit authority, a recent law review comment recom- 
mends that Congress further clarify the scope of power given the FCC in this area. Com- 
ment, The Power of the FCC to Regulate Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-Ownership: The 
Need for Congressional Clarification, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1708 (1977). 
44. 98 S. Ct. a t  2111-13. 
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proposed regulations are intended to enhance-not limit- 
information diversity, and do not discriminate on the basis of 
the broadcasters' social or political views." By encouraging 
various broadcast voices through promulgation of rules against 
multiple ~wnership ,~ '  the FCC seeks greater message plura- 
lism," thus contributing to "an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas."4u This diversity objective is consistent with the first 
amendment: 
The Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possi- 
ble dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press 
is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the 
government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not 
afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose 
restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.49 
Thus, government control is permissible to allay the "widespread 
fear that . . . the public interest might be subordinated to mono- 
polistic domination in the broadcasting field."50 
B. Diversity in Media Ownership Regulation 
1 .  Broadcast licensing 
Although in granting new broadcast licenses the Commission 
gives preference to applicants who add a new media owner to a 
community," diversity has not been accorded the same import- 
45. Id. at  2114-15. These rules may not amount to a first amendment abridgment, 
but might be limited by the general policy against government intervention. See text 
accompanying note 162 infra. 
46. "Multiple ownership'' in this context refers to ownership of more than one broad- 
cast facility-standard (AM) broadcast stations, frequency modulated (FM) stations, 
VHF or UHF television stations-by the same individual or company. See, e-g., 47 C.F.R. 
Q 73.35(a) (1977). 
47. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. a t  2107-08. 
48. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 US.  367, 390 (1969). 
49. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
50. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U S .  134, 137 (1940). 
51. "[Tlhe 1965 Policy Statement promulgated the doctrine that in a comparative 
situation an applicant not associated with other media interests should be given preferen- 
tial consideration of primary significance as against applicants having other interests 
. . . ." Hyde, FCC Policy and Procedures Relating to Hearings on Broadcast Applications 
in Which a New Applicant Seeks to Displace a Licensee Seeking Renewal, 1975 DUKE L.J. 
253, 253 (emphasis added)(commenting on the Policy Statement on Comparative Broad- 
cast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Policy Statement]). 
Former FCC Chairman Rose1 H. Hyde wrote that this policy elevated the "diversification 
criterion to equal status as 'service to the public.' " Id. a t  263. See McClatchy Broadcast- 
ing Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U S .  917 (1957)(where all 
other factors were substantially equal between two new applicants, the FCC appropriately 
awarded the license to the one disassociated from other media interests). 
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ance in cases where an incumbent licensee seeks to renew a li- 
cense for another three years.52 Historically, ownership diversity 
has often been neglected as a factor in license renewal hearings; 
rather, an incumbent's previous record has been emphasized be- 
cause it has been regarded as a more reliable indicator of future 
service than a new applicant's untested proposals.53 
In 1969, however, the FCC caused a furor in the broadcast 
industry when for the first time it refused to renew the license of 
a broadcast station (WHDH) that had an "average" record of 
perf~rmance.~~ Instead, the Commission granted the license to an 
applicant that would add to the diversity of control over mass 
communications media in the area and be more actively involved 
in the station's operation.55 Even there, however, the FCC gave 
diversity controlling weight only due to a unique factual situa- 
tion. The action was challenged in Greater Boston Television 
Corp. v. FCC (WHDH).56 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the Commis- 
sion's decision to give diversity prime consideration and noted 
that WHDH was treated as a new applicant only because "unique 
events and procedures . . . place[d] WHDH in a substantially 
different posture from the conventional applicant for renewal of 
a broadcast license. "57 
In response to the uncertainty caused by the D.C. Circuit 
decision in WHDH, the FCC promulgated a policy statement 
that essentially precluded consideration of diversity by permit- 
ting incumbent licensees to forgo comparative hearings if they 
can first show "substantial" previous pe r fo rman~e .~~  In Citizens 
52. When the FCC adopted the policy in favor of diversity in new license proceedings, 
it noted that it was not attempting to deal with the somewhat different problems raised 
in comparative renewal proceedings. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 51, a t  393, n.1. 
53. See Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677, 679 (1963); Hearst Radio, 
Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1178 (1951). Licenses have been renewed routinely. Jaffe, WHDH: 
The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HAW. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (1969). In 
renewal proceedings the FCC has considered several factors and applied differing weights 
depending on the circumstances. 
54. W: GORMLEY, supra note 11, a t  23, 26. 
55. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), aff'd, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 403 U.S.  923 (1971). 
56. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). 
57. Id. at 849 (quoting WHDH, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d 856, 873 (1969)). Over a 12-year 
period, WHDH had always been granted operating authorization for less than the normal 
three-year period. In view of the abbreviated nature of the WHDH tenure, the station was 
never considered a conventional applicant for renewal possessing "legitimate renewal 
expectancies." Id. at 849, 854. 
58. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal 
Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424,425-26 (1970). Media interests had also encouraged Congress 
to combat the anticipated negative effects of WHDH. Senator John Pastore introduced 
legislation barring the FCC from considering a competitive application unless the incum- 
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Communications Center v.  FCC59 the D.C. Circuit held that this 
statement did not conform to statutory authority. The court rea- 
soned that by granting renewal to an incumbent upon a showing 
of substantial performance the FCC precluded challengers from 
receiving a hearing on their own. applications, contrary to the 
express provision in the Communications Act requiring a full 
hearing if a substantial or material question of fact is presented 
by a competing a p p l i c a t i ~ n . ~ ~  However, in spite of the decisions 
in WHDH and Citizens Communications Center, the courts still 
allow for "legitimate renewal expectancie~"~~ and judge incum- 
bent licensees "primarily on their records of past perf~rmance."~~ 
In the eight years since WHDH the Commission has never 
granted a television license to a challenger when the incumbent 
has maintained a t  least an average record of past performance in 
the public interest." The FCC has recently taken the position 
that a record of meritorious service-and not diversity-may be 
c~ntrol l ing .~~ 
2. Rules restricting media ownership concentration 
The concentration of ownership once afforded the media in- 
dustry has been restricted in stages. The 1940 FM rule provided 
that in the future no person should own or control more than one 
station in the same market unless he shouldered the burden of 
bent failed to serve the public interest. S. 2004,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); see 115 CONG. 
REc. 10632 (1969). Hearings were held on these new license renewal procedures, but the 
bill was dropped because the Communications Subcommittee did not report it out of 
committee that year. W. GORMLEY, supra note 11, a t  26-27. Similar legislation was pro- 
posed in 1974. See note 63 infra. 
59. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
60. Id. at 1211-14. The hearing is required by 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). 
61. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 854 (1970). 
62. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
See Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 698-702 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in which the 
court of appeals supported the Commission's consideration of past service and separation 
between ownership and station management in renewing a broadcast license. Normally 
the Commission gives substantial credit to local ownership in comparative hearings and 
seeks high integration between owner and manager. 
63. I. KRASNOW, THE P O L ~ C S  OF BROADCAST REGULATION 204 (2d ed. 1978). Both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate passed license renewal bills in 1974 which would 
have granted incumbent licensees a presumption in favor of renewal if they were 
"substantially" responsive to local needs, regardless of diversity. The bills were not en- 
acted because a conference committee was never assigned to "iron out" the differences 
between the House and Senate versions of the bill. W. GORMLEY, supra note 11, a t  30-33. 
64. See Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Comparative Hearing Process, 42 Fed. Reg. 
19379 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Broadcast Renewal Policies]. The Commission 
recently did not award a preference to a challenger even though the incumbent owned both 
AM and FM stations in the same city as the television station in question; Fidelity 
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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showing that competition would be fostered or a distinct service 
rendered. Existing FM combinations in the same city were grand- 
fathered? 
In 1941 the Commission promulgated rules restricting multi- 
ple ownership of both AM and FM stationP in an attempt to 
strike a balance between the policies favoring diversity and eco- 
nomic competition and the need to avoid undue disruption of 
existing services.67 These chain-broadcastingsR regulations, sus- 
tained by the Supreme Court, were designed to curb abuses that 
the FCC had discovered and to limit the existing networks' inor- 
dinate control of the media? The rules required divestiture only 
where two AM stations were controlled by the same network in 
the same area, or where the available facilities were so few that 
the network had no c ~ m p e t i t i o n . ~ ~  When the Commission later 
barred single parties from owning two AM broadcast stations in 
the same community, divestiture was required in twenty cases." 
At approximately the same time, the Supreme Court in 
Associated Press v. United States72 found the Associated Press' 
membership restraints illegal because they ultimately deprived 
the public of information from diverse sources, in violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.73 
In United States v. Storer Broadcasting C O . , ~ ~  the Supreme 
Court upheld the FCC multiple ownership rule limiting a licensee 
to five VHF television stations, and found a full hearing unneces- 
sary unless it could be shown that in a particular case the rule 
65. See note 6 supra for an overview of the early multiple ownership rules, including 
those restricting ownership of FM stations. 
66. Rules and Regulations Governing Commercial Television Broadcast Stations, 6 
Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941). 
67. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 218 (1943). 
68. Chain broadcasting refers to the simultaneous broadcasting of one program by 
two or more connected stations. 
69. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The record of monopolistic improprie- 
ties was strong. Id. a t  21?-18. The decision recognized apparent antitrust violations al- 
though the resolution of the case did not rely on antitrust policy. Id. a t  191, 223. 
70. Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED. COM. B.J. 
1, 6-7 (1974). 
71. When more strict standards were set for determining overlap of co-located sta- 
tions, no divestiture was required. Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of 
the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television 
Broadcast Stations, 45 F.C.C. 1476 (1964). 
72. 326 U.S. 1 (1944). 
73. Id. at 12. The Associated Press abused its media concentration posture by exclud- 
ing certain newspapers from receiving its news service reports. The wire service's members 
"pooled their economic and news control power and in exerting that power, have entered 
into agreements plainly designed in the interest of preventing competition." Id. a t  16. 
74. 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 
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should be waived. The five-station limit was based on the Com- 
mission's experience in assessing concentration of media 
"coupled with a design to avoid undue disruption of existing sta- 
tion o ~ n e r s h i p . " ~ ~  
In 1970 the Commission adopted an as-yet-unchallenged 
"one to a market" rule to prohibit a single party from gaining 
control of two or more full-time broadcast stations within a single 
community. This rule did not require divestiture of existing com- 
binations, although it did prohibit the future sale of an existing 
combination to a single party.'$ 
Similarly, the FCC has restricted the ownership of cable tele- 
vision systems. The Commission effectively prevented telephone 
companies from providing cable television service to their tele- 
phone cu~tomers,~' and forbade the ownership or control of cable 
systems by national television networks or television broadcast 
stations in the same c o r n m ~ n i t y . ~ ~  Although the Commission 
chose not to grandfather existing television-cable combinations 
as a matter of course, enforcement of this ruling has been liberally 
waived.79 In 1975 the FCC decided against establishing a rule to 
restrict newspaper publishers from owning cable systems because 
it found no abusive trends resulting from the cross-ownership.Ro 
The FCC in the course of its rulemaking proceedings com- 
pared the extent. of local programming, information diversity, 
75. Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 55, 56 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1956) 
(on remand). In the few instances where the number limit was exceeded, the divestiture 
was dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of 
the Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television 
Broadcast Stations, 18 F.C.C.2d 288, 292, 295 (1953). 
Relying on Storer the D.C. Circuit held that divestiture can be ordered without 
individual hearings because a hearing is unnecessary when the Commission finds an 
applicant unqualified by application of standards set to further the public interest. Fur- 
thermore, the court reasoned that the economic loss to a station owner ordered to divest 
is not as great as the loss to an owner whose license is simply not renewed, since the 
divested owner can always sell his license while the applicant denied renewal has no 
license interest to sell. 555 F.2d at 955-56. 
76. First Report and Order, supra note 6, at 306. 
77. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54 (1977). 
78. 47 C.F.R. 8 76.501(a) (1977). The original regulation was approved in General Tel. 
Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). 
79. W. BAER, H. GELLER, J. GRUNDFEST, & K. POSSNER, CONCENTRATION OF MASS 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP: ASSESSING THE STATE OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 29 (1974) [hereinafter 
cited as W. BAER]. 
80. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to 
Diversification of Control of Community Antenna Television Systems, 52 F.C.C.2d 170, 
171 (1975). 
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public affairs programming, and advertising rates of newspaper- 
owned stations with the same characteristics of independently 
held stationsu1 and concluded as did the D.C. Circuitx2 that the 
"record no more establishes that cross-ownership serves the pub- 
lic interest than injures it."83 Because of this inconclusive record, 
the Commission ruled that there was no overwhelming need for 
divestiture except in one-newspaper, one-broadcast communities 
where "competition and diversity are absent?' The D.C. Circuit, 
however, asserted that "precisely the opposite presumption is 
compelled, and that divestiture is required except in those cases 
where the evidence clearly discloses that cross-ownership is in the 
public interest."" The Supreme Court in effect upheld the FCC 
because it was "unable to find anything in the Communications 
Act, the First Amendment, or the Commission's past or present 
practices" that supports a presumption that diversity should be 
given controlling weight in all c i rc~mstances .~~ 
A. Broadcast Licensing Procedures 
Analysis of licensing disputes shows that the Commission 
has balanced several factors in deciding whether to grant or deny 
license renewaW7 While in awarding new licenses the Commis- 
sion requires that ownership diversity be accorded "primary sig- 
n i f i can~e , "~  as the Supreme Court noted this policy has never 
been applied directly in a comparative hearing for license 
renewaP9 Since the divestiture issue concerns only existing 
81. Brief for Respondent at 9 n.6, National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 
555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). 
82. 555 F.2d at 956-61. 
83. See W. BAER, supra note 79, a t  79; Leuchter, Media Cross-Ownership-The 
FCC's Inadequate Response, 54 TEX. L. REV. 336, 369 (1976). 
84. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1088 n.29. 
85. 555 F.2d at 966. 
86. 98 S. Ct. a t  2119-20. 
87. Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEO. L.J. 655, 
660-61 (1959). The factors listed by Schwartz include: (1) local ownership, (2) integration 
of ownership and management, (3) past performance, (4) broadcast experience, (5) pro- 
posed programming and policies, and (6) diversity of the media of mass communication. 
Schwartz criticizes past FCC inconsistency and political favoritism and advocates admin- 
istrative changes-including controlled competitive bidding for broadcast licen- 
ses-without recommending greater emphasis for diversified ownership. 
88. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 51, at 394. Full-time participation in station 
operation by owners and "past performance" are only of "substantial importance," thus 
apparently of less merit. Other factors do not warrant an affirmative preference and are 
considered only if on petition by one of the parties the factor is studied and reveals a 
substantial difference between applicants for a new license. Other factors include pro- 
posed program service, efficient use of frequency, and applicant character. Id. at 393-400. 
89. 98 S. Ct. at 2120. 
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media owners, the policy relating to license renewals, rather than 
new applications, should apply. 
In license renewal proceedings the "relative weight" to be 
afforded the evidence once entered "will depend on the facts of 
the particular case?"' Diversity has never been the overriding 
factor, but merely one of several factors in the successful appli- 
cant's favorY The Commission considers the anticipated contri- 
bution of the owner to station operations and proposed program- 
ming, and generally accords central importance to the incum- 
bent's past pe r f~rmance .~~  The diversification factor assumes a 
greater significance only if a license renewal would perpetuate a 
serious monopoly,93 documented abuses,g4 or a violation of exist- 
ing media ownership rules.95 Thus, the Commission clearly does 
90. 1977 Broadcast Renewal Policies, supra note 64, at 19384. See Belo Broadcasting 
Corp., 47 F.C.C.2d 540,544 (1974); Seven League Productions, Inc., 1 F.C.C.2d 1597,1598 
(1965). 
The D.C. Circuit appeared to be confused concerning the 1965 Policy Statement's 
application. Chief Judge Bazelon cited the above two cases for the proposition that the 
policy is not applicable to "noncomparative hearings." 555 F.2d at 944 n.9. He apparently 
intended to state that the FCC does apply the policy in a renewal context although the 
1965 FCC statement is expressly not applicable to incumbent licensees. Rather, these 
cases show that the policy has not been employed to weigh competing considerations in 
the final decision, but only applies to the introduction of evidence for renewal applica- 
tions. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 854 (1970). 
Chief Judge Bazelon also erroneously cited the policy as the "1965 Policy Statement 
on Comparative Renewal Hearings," 555 F.2d at 944 n.9 (emphasis added), although its 
correct title is "1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings." See note 51 
supra. Similar confusion exists at 555 F.2d at 963 n.94. 
91. For example, in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951), the Commission was upheld in finding that a combina- 
tion of ownership diversity, integration of local ownership and management, and familiar- 
ity with local conditions served as the basis for granting a radio license. See Chicagoland 
TV Co., 11 F.C.C.2d 119 (1967). 
92. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. a t  2105 & n.5. 
93. The Commission's refusal to renew a television broadcast station in Frontier 
Broadcasting Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 486 (1971), was upheld because of Frontier's extreme media 
monopoly in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The family-owned corporation owned the town's only 
television station, the only full-time AM radio station, an FM radio station, the only cable 
television system, and the only daily newspaper. Id. at 486. In Chicagoland TV Co., 11 
F.C.C.2d 119 (1967), diversity was of "reduced significance because of the multiplicity of 
other services available" in the Chicago area. Id. at 137. Although the successful applicant 
already owned a powerful radio station and a monthly newspaper, it was awarded the 
license because of its financial capability, integration of ownership and management, and 
superiority in coverage and service contour. 
94. Because a radio license applicant, the owner of the only newspaper in town, had 
in the past used exclusive advertising contracts, boycotts, and other monopolistic methods 
in attempting to destroy the existing radio station in the area, his application was denied. 
Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
95. Citizens TV Protest Comm. v. FCC, 348 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Commission 
abused discretion in granting license for television station without a hearing where result 
was common ownership of a community antenna television system and local television 
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not ips0 facto grant "controlling weight" to ownership diversity 
in renewal hearings. Although as a general rule diversity must be 
accorded some importance, its weight relative to other factors 
depends upon the particular situation? 
B. Other Multiple Ownership Rulings 
Despite the absence of an affirmative showing of abuse aris- 
ing out of common ownership, the D.C. Circuit reversed the Com- 
mission and set down a virtually irrebuttable presumption 
against cross-o~nership.~' The D .C. Circuit cited several FCC 
regulations in an attempt to support its statement that "diversity 
is central to the Communications Act."" These regulations, how- 
ever, are direct attempts a t  increasing information diversity, not 
merely ownership diversity, by curbing documented abuses? 
The Supreme Court found the FCC's ruling to be consistent 
with both the Commission's previous rulings and with court deci- 
s i o n ~ . ' ~  When the Court sustained the Commission's regulations 
against chain broadcasting in NBC v. United States,lO' it recog- 
nized that diversity was a significant factor in the public interest, 
but required divestiture only upon a showing of the network's 
misuse of commonly owned media. NBC's exclusive arrange- 
station in the same town in violation of FCC multiple ownership rule); Clarksburg Pub- 
lishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (Commission license grant successfully 
protested where grant would result in a violation of existing multiple ownership rules 
because one party would own two television stations serving substantially the same area). 
96. See Comment, Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Structural Model for 
FCC Comparative Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U .  CHI. L. REV. 573 (1976). 
97. 555 F.2d at  963. 
98. 555 F.2d at  948 n.26. 
99. For example, the licensing policies for AM and FM stations have been designed 
to control such network abuses as (1) affiliation exclusivity, (2) territorial exclusivity over 
network programming, (3) contractual ties with networks for excessively long periods, (4) 
unlimited network preemption of local station time, (5) restrictions on station rejection 
rights, (6) network organization ownership of more than one station in an area, (7) "dual" 
network operation, and (8) network control of station advertising rates. See 47 C.F.R. 08  
73.132, .139, .232, .239-.240, .242 (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 16,421-22 (1977). Diversity is not 
the central aim of the regulation that requires flexibility in program arrangements and 
calls for local programming during specific evening hours. 47 C.F.R. 0 73.658 (1977). The 
regulation emphasizes local programming geared to local issues. Here the FCC concern is 
not that networks present amply diverse views, but rather that the views be well-suited 
to local needs. A decision also cited by the D.C. Circuit, Metropolitan Television Co. v. 
FCC, 289 F.2d 874,876 (D.C. Cir. 1961), upheld the prohibition of network sale of nonnet- 
work time. The court found an abuse because this type of network control restricted the 
individual licensee's independence. Since this abuse can exist even though every single 
affiliate is separately owned, it is clear that information diversity and not ownership 
diversity was the controlling consideration for this court. 
100. 98 S. Ct. a t  2120. 
101. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
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ments were found to prevent the airing of others' ideas and pro- 
grams in an area served by a network affiliate, while network 
regulation of advertising rates severely restricted economic com- 
petition. Thus across-the-board breakup of AM station ownership 
or control was ordered only because concentration of ownership 
and monopolistic abuse were serious.'02 
Although no two AM stations controlled by the same network 
in the same community were allowed to continue, this does not 
apply today to newspaper-broadcast combinations. Because the 
national network provides a major part of programming for local 
stations, the potential damage to the public interest is much 
greater in the chain-broadcasting context than in the area of local 
newspaper-broadcast combinations. Community newspaper- 
broadcast combinations do not monopolize one branch of the 
media and do not wield nationwide control. In Associated Press, 
as in NBC, the Supreme Court relied on a finding of abuse in 
ordering a stop to practices "plainly designed in the interest of 
preventing competition. "Io3 
In contrast, a pattern of monopolistic abuse has not been 
demonstrated in the cross-ownership of newspapers and broad- 
cast stations. There exists no evidence of an effort to censor or 
monopolize ideas or to obtain unfair commercial advantage over 
 competitor^.^^ Most studies testing the possible harm to the pub- 
lic interest resulting from newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership 
have found no significant difference between individually and 
cross-owned stations.lo5 A recent comprehensive study of past re- 
search found most of the allegations concerning the positive or 
102. The "chain broadcasting" decision recognized apparent antitrust violations, but 
did not employ antitrust principles to resolve the case. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 
at 191, 221-23. The Justice Department would find it substantially difficult to show th?t 
newspaper-broadcast combinations have violated the antitrust laws. Leuchter, supra 
note 83, at 344-45,370; see Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing With a 
Section Seven Lens, 66 Nw. L. REV. 159, 187 (1971). The Justice Department, however, 
unsuccessfully urged the court of appeals to reverse by giving antitrust policy "prima facie 
effect." 555 F.2d at 965 n.107. The court of appeals was correct in denying this argument's 
validity. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67,86-87 (1944). Moreover, 
"encouragement of competition as such has not been considered the single or controlling 
reliance for safeguarding the public interest." FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 
U.S. 86, 93 (1953). 
103. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. at 16. 
104. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 959. This abuse 
could be manifested by a newspaper-broadcast combination's one-sided treatment of 
stories in which it has an interest, a newspaper's favored treatment to radio and television 
listings of its co-owned station, cut rates to those who advertise in both halves of a combi- 
nation, and use of the same reporter and information by both the newspaper and broad- 
cast station in order to tell a news story. 
105. These studies were summarized by the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 957. 
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negative effects of media ownership concentration on media per- 
formance not proven.lo6 In the absence of evidence indicating that 
diversity of ideas or competition is restricted due to media con- 
centration, the case for divestiture is weak or nonexistent.lo7 Thus 
the FCC was reasonable in concluding that divestiture is too dras- 
tic a remedy in most cases of cross-ownership. Although it is 
likely that evidence showing abuses of cross-ownership is difficult 
to collect, the mere possibility of impropriety is not a sufficient 
basis for ordering the separation of all co-located newspaper- 
broadcast combinations. Because newspaper-broaacast cross- 
ownership has not been shown to restrict information diversity, 
rules restricting cross-ownership would be only an indirect, spec- 
ulative manner of insuring diversity of ideas. 
C.  Diversity of Ownership v .  Diversity of Ideas 
In treating the newpaper-broadcast cross-ownership issue, 
both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court ignored the fact 
that the Commission's "primary concern is diversity in program- 
ming service,"lo8 not simply diversity of ownership. While owner- 
ship in some circumstances carries with it the power to edit, alter, 
and select information,lo9 the amount and degree to which this 
power is actually used is undocumented. The FCC rationally con- 
cluded that because there was no evidence of a lack of program 
or information variety due to common ownership, it would order 
divestiture only in the most serious cases of ownership concentra- 
tion where message pluralism is more likely to be restrictedY0 In 
contrast, the D.C. Circuit based its decision to require divestiture 
in all cases on the unproven premise that the increase in the 
number of owners resulting from divestiture would increase the 
diversity of views receiving public airing? Admittedly, the pub- 
106. W. BAER, supra note 79, a t  ix. A report made since the oral arguments before 
the FCC concerning the regulations indicates that cross-ownership increases to a small 
degree (16.7%) the likelihood that co-located newspapers and broadcast stations will carry 
the same stories. Half of this story overlap is attributed to three factors: carbon-sharing 
(newspaper provides co-owned station with copies of all articles, and vice versa), cross- 
employment, and location of the station and newspaper in the same complex of buildings. 
The report's author, however, does not recommend across-the-board divestiture. W. 
GORMLEY, supra note 11, a t  210-11 & nn. 11-12. 
107. See Amendment of Part 76. of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative 
to Diversification of Control of Community Antenna Television Systems, 52 F.C.C.2d 170, 
171 (1975). 
108. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1079 n.27, 1080. 
109. Id. a t  1050. 
110. Id. at  1080. 
111. 555 F.2d at 950. However, it is at least arguable that a co-located newspaper- 
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lic has a right implied from the first amendment to hear a wide 
range of ideas or messages.l12 However, because the gains in mes- 
sage pluralism resulting from increased diversity of ownership are 
only speculative, the diversification argument is significantly 
weakened. 
Other means for securing the public interest in diverse view- 
points already exist. For example, the "fairness doctrine" re- 
quires that radio and television broadcasters, as public trustees, 
provide coverage of issues of public importance and present both 
sides of the issues fairly.l13 Similarly, the "equal time" provisions 
provide a safeguard for fair and diversified treatment of political 
campaigns,l14 and the "prime time access rule" encourages 
"diverse and antagonistic sources of program service" during eve- 
ning hours to "correct a situation where only three organizations 
control access to the crucial prime time evening television sched- 
ule."l15 These existing provisions promote diversity of information 
without the disadvantageous side effects of a rule requiring 
across-the-board divestiture. 116 
D. Reduced Cross- Ownership and Technological Progress 
The D.C. Circuit feared that should the FCC decision to 
grandfather the majority of existing newspaper-broadcast combi- 
nations be upheld, transfers of only a few co-located combina- 
tions would not realistically dissipate the concentration of owner- 
ship. Recently compiled statistics, however, indicate the court's 
fears are unfounded. In 1950, 40.2% of the nation's commercial 
television stations were owned or controlled by local newspapers, 
while the percentage in 1975 was 10.4. In 1955 there were 127 such 
combinations; today there are only 65."' 
broadcast combination could devote more resources to newsgathering and consequently 
provide greater diversity of viewpoints than if separately owned. 
112. The assumption that diversity of information is of first amendment importance 
is a logical twist of the amendment. The Bill of Rights was written to protect free speech 
from government infringement, but court decisions suggest that the government also 
must guarantee the citizen's right to hear various and differing views. See Note, The 
Listener's Right to Hear to Broadcasting, 22 STAN. L. REV. 863, 869 (1970). 
113. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58 (1949). Adher- 
ence to this doctrine is the single most important requirement of broadcast operation in 
the public interest. Committee for the  Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 
F.C.C.2d 283, 292 (1970). 
114. 47 U.S.C. 4 315 (1970). 
115. Mount Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1971). 
116. See notes 120-50 and accompanying text infra. 
117. Brief for Petitioner FCC a t  7, 8 & n.14, FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for 
Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). 
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The argument that under the Supreme Court's ruling in 
NCCB the newspaper-broadcast concentration will persist is fur- 
ther diluted by the possibility that progress in technology may 
eliminate scarcity of broadcast space, thus weakening the justifi- 
cation for broadcast regulation and emphasis on diversity of own- 
ership.l18 Cable television, satellites, fine tuning, and other devel- 
opments could make scarcity a bygone concern. These realistic 
possibilities for the future, some of which are beginning to mater- 
ialize in the form of cable television, should serve to limit some- 
what the concern over concentration of ownership. 
The Supreme Court recognized the Commission's ultimate 
goal of providing for the "best practicable service to the public" 
and found a rational basis for the Commission's cross-ownership 
rule in the FCC's belief that divestiture would often result in a 
decrease in local ownership and management, a disruption of 
continuity and stability of public service, and an increase in pri- 
vate economic losses.11g Although perhaps no one of these factors 
alone overrides diversification policy, together they substantially 
discredit diversity as a controlling factor. 
A. Local Ownership 
In various rulemaking proceedings the Commission has con- 
sidered the extent to which a proposed rule will affect local owner- 
ship or control of broadcasting facilities.120 Such consideration is 
warranted by a belief that local control is likely to result in more 
community service and a keener awareness and coverage of local 
The FCC's limited divestiture order would have broken up  seven television- 
newspaper combinations. Six transfers proposed during the last year are now awaiting 
approval by the FCC, including two recently proposed in a "swap" between the Washing- 
ton Post Company (WTOP-TV) and the Evening News Association (WWJ-TV) of Detroit. 
BROADCASTING, Dec. 12, 1977, a t  20. Although figures are not available, a similar trend 
exists for newspaper-radio combinations. Brief for Petitioner FCC a t  8 n.14. 
118. Economic realities, however, will not permit an unlimited number of broadcast- 
ers to operate successfully. 
119. 96 S. Ct. a t  2116-17. 
120. In an effort to restrict national monopolies from inhibiting local control, the 
Commission limits one party to seven AM stations, seven FM stations and seven TV 
stations (five of which may be VHF). Television Multiple Ownership, 9 Fed. Reg. 5442 
(1942). Networks proposing acquisitions of more than three TV stations in the top 50 
markets have been required to show a compelling public interest to justify the purchases, 
although the Commission has always approved the license applications. W. BAER, supra 
note 79, at 19. 
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issues.121 Thus the FCC often emphasizes the significance of local 
pr~gramrningl~~ and participation of owners in management.123 
The D.C. Circuit took a contrary position and suggested that 
local ownership offers no promise that station policy will be at- 
tuned to local needs.124 The likelihood, however, that local inter- 
ests will be better served by local ownership is just as great as the 
probability that increased diversity of information will result 
from increased diversity of ownership. 
At present seventy-five percent of all newspaper-broadcast 
combinations are locally owned. The Supreme Court approved of 
the Commission's "rational prediction"lZ that the many sales 
required by divestiture would be to outside interests, especially 
if widespread trading occurred among those required to divest 
Proponents of divestiture suggested that decreases in local owner- 
ship be prevented by providing local groups the first opportunity 
to purchase a divested station, or requiring multiple bids? These 
requirements, however, would probably violate section 310(b) of 
the Communications Act.lZ8 Although local ownership may not be 
a concern in every case, across-the-board divestiture should not 
be ordered without consideration of this factor. 
121. W. GORMLEY, supra note 11, at 185-88. See generally, WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 
1, 74-94, 103-35 (1969). 
122. 1977 Broadcast Renewal Policies, supra note 64, at 19381. See, e.g., United 
States v. Midwest Video Corp. 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (upheld rule requiring cable television 
systems to originate some local programs); Simmons v. FCC, 169 F.2d 6?0 (D.C. Cir.) 
(power increase and frequency change denied because of applicant's failure to tailor pro- 
grams to local needs), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 846 (1948); 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1977) (regula- 
tion requiring local television programming geared to local issues). 
123. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 51, at 395. See, e.g., Chicagoland TV Co., 11 
F.C.C.2d 119, 137 (1967) (integration of ownership and management found central in new 
license application comparison). 
124. 555 F.2d at  963. The court observed that no evidence was presented showing that 
local owners are involved in daily management, especially since most newspapers and 
broadcast stations have separate management. Id. a t  964. The Supreme Court, however, 
pointed out that separate management "does not foreclose the possibility that the com- 
mon owner participates in management" of one or the other. 98 S. Ct. a t  2117 n.23. 
125. 98 S. Ct. a t  2119. 
126. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1078. See note 117 supra. Figures 
do not exist to show the number of recent transfers that have resulted in decreased local 
ownership. 
127. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1069. 
128. 47 U.S.C. 4 310(b) (1970). This section provides that a transfer cannot be ap- 
proved except upon a finding that the "public interest, convenience, and necessity will 
be served thereby." The Commission, however, may not consider whether the public 
interest might be better served by a transfer to a person other than the proposed trans- 
feree. 
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B. Continuity and Stability of Pub lie Service 
The FCC has always regarded the need to preserve continu- 
ity of public service as a limitation on the applicability of its 
multiple ownership rules. Thus most of its rules operate prospec- 
tively and when divestiture is ordered, it  is "coupled with 
a design to avoid undue disruption of existing station owner- 
ship."130 The court of appeals questioned the significance of the 
disruption-to-service factor because of its apparent inconsistency 
with the Commission's practice of routinely permitting existing 
broadcasters to assign their licenses to others.131 Although license 
assignments are allowed, the FCC has expressed great concern a t  
the high rate of license turnover and now requires a hearing to 
approve license transfers during the first three-year license 
term.132 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court pointed out, " '[tlhe 
question of whether the Commission should compel proven licen- 
sees to divest their stations is a different question from whether 
the public interest is served by allowing transfers by licensees who 
no longer wish to continue in business.' The resultant forced 
broadcasting may then be continuous, but probably not "worth 
preserving. "Is4 
Licensees need time to fully implement the proposals made 
in their original license applications in order to "gain a better 
understanding of the program needs and desires of the com- 
munity, and to adjust programing to such needs and  interest^."^^ 
The Supreme Court's decision protects the public's interest in 
being served by those stations that have demonstrated a long 
129. See note 6 supra. 
130. Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 55, 56 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
These rules prohibiting one party from owning more than seven AM stations, seven FM, 
and five VHF-TV stations were set so as not to be "unduly disruptive." Amendment of 
Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Owner- 
ship of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288,292 (1953). The 15 VHF 
stations owned and operated by the three networks serve markets reaching one-third of 
all television households in the United States and generate one-sixth of the advertising 
revenue reported for all stations. W. BAER, supra note 79, a t  46. See also NBC v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190, 206-07 (1943), in which the Supreme Court, in affirming the chain- 
broadcasting regulations, implicitly approved the Commission's decision against requiring 
extensive divestiture. 
131. 555 F.2d at 964. 
132. 47 C.F.R. 8 1.597 (1977). 
133. 98 S. Ct. a t  2121. 
134. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner FCC at  38, FCC v. National Citizens Comm. 
for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978)). 
135. Amendment of Part I of the Commission's Rules Adding Section 1.365 Concern- 
ing Application for Voluntary Assignments of Transfers of Control, 32 F.C.C. 689, 690 
(1962). 
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term commitment to broadcasting and have learned to meet the 
special needs of the community.136 This concern is well repre- 
sented by an amicus curiae statement filed by the State of Utah 
in support of the FCC's petition for certiorari. The statement 
maintains that through divestiture Utah citizens would be de- 
prived of a quality station, with the possibility that the successor 
would not meet the same high standards.l" 
C. Prevention of Economic Loss 
Private economic loss can be a factor when shown to have an 
adverse effect on service to the ~ub1 ic . l~~  For example, the threat 
of economic ruin to an existing station, with the resulting loss of 
service to the public, has caused the Commission to deny applica- 
tions to add media facilities in a particular community.139 Divesti- 
ture could force the demise of newspapers held in combination 
with broadcast stations where the newspapers are operating on a 
marginal budget." Thus, grandfathering the majority of existing 
combinations is consistent with the policy of the Newspaper Pres- 
ervation Act, in which Congress chose not to require the separa- 
tion of newspaper combinations in order to prevent a decline in 
the total number of newspapers serving the public.141 If grand- 
136. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. a t  2118. 
137. Statement in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari a t  2-3, FCC v. National 
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. 2096 (1978). 
138. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at  964. 
139. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's denial of an application for the 
introduction of a CATV system into a rural area in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. 
v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1973). The court agreed with 
the Commission that the existing local broadcast station could better serve local needs 
and its possible demise would result in a loss of vital service, thus depriving the com- 
munity of free television. No increase in diversity of competition or ideas could outweigh 
the local service factor. Thus the Commission was correct in using a "net effect" test, 
instead of concentrating solely on diversity. Id. at  365-66. Similarly, the D.C. Circuit 
allowed an existing radio station to contest the application for a second station in the area 
on the grounds that the market could not support both. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 
258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The overabundance of economic competition would have 
affected the quality of service to the public because one financially stable stat.ion can 
better meet the public need than two competing diverse voices that are both financially 
weak. Id. a t  443. 
140. The Boston Herald died from financial difficulty shortly after the Commission 
forced it to divest its wholly owned subsidiary, WHDH-TV. Second Report and Order, 
supra note 2, a t  1107. Divestiture appears more likely to result in the demise of newspapers 
than of broadcast stations. Id. a t  1067, 1107. 
141. Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 5  1801-1804 (1976). If a newspaper can 
show that it would fail without financial backing from its co-owned station, the Commis- 
sion would grant waiver. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1085. This may have 
met the concern for the viability of the newspapers, although the burden of showing the 
need for waiver was left with the newspaper publisher. 
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fathering were permitted for this reason, it would be in deference 
to private economic interests although in consideration of the 
overall public interest. lt2 
In addition to private financial concern, a financially stable 
station is less subject to pressure from advertisers and others to 
alter informationlt3 and more able to adequately represent the 
minor as well as the dominant forces in a community.lt4 Economic 
stability also better enables existing owners to contribute to the 
development of new and varied media sources, such as UHF.lW 
D. Summary 
Because the Commission has acquired the appropriate power 
from Congress and has developed significant expertise over the 
years in assessing policies relevant to broadcast media, its deci- 
sions should be given great deference. As the D.C. Circuit said in 
WHDH, "Avoiding concentration of control in communication is 
such an important objective that the Commission must be ac- 
corded discretion in choice of measures for its f~lf i l l rnent ."~~~ 
Thus, the reviewing court must leave the "FCC to consider diver- 
sification of control in connection with all other relevant factors 
and to attach such significance to it as its judgment dictates."147 
The D.C. Circuit did not defer to the FCC's judgment.lt8 The 
There is, however, no substantial evidence of joint-operating economies between 
cross-owned newspapers and broadcast stations, W. BAER, supra note 79, a t  60-62, nor is 
it clear that broadcast stations financially support newspapers. National Citizens Comm. 
for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d a t  965. 
142. The power to grandfather has the same justifications as the power to prohibit 
newspapers from owning broadcast stations in the same community, although the effect 
is the opposite. 
143. See Mills, Moynahan, Perlini, & McClure, The Constitutional Considerations 
of Multiple Media Ownership Regulation by the Federal Communications Commission, 
24 AM. U.L. REV. 1217, 1237 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mills]. 
144. See H. LEVIN, BROADCAST REGULATION A D JOINT OWNERSHIP OF MEDIA 29 (1960). 
145. See Howard, supra note 70, a t  54-55. 
146. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,860 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). 
147. McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. 
denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957). 
148. The D.C. Circuit also erred in remanding the record to the Commission for 
adoption of a rule requiring divestiture. Normally, it is a "guiding principle" that the 
"function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the 
matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration." FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 
344 U.S. 17,20 (1952). If an appellate court decides the importance of a factor, the exercise 
of discretion in reassessing all factors remains open to the agency. United States v. Sas- 
katchewan Minerals, 385 U.S. 94,95 (1966); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 US. 194, 208-09 
(1947). Therefore, even if the court of appeals had been correct in reversing the FCC's 
policy judgment, it should only have remanded "for proceedings not inconsistent" with 
its opinion. 
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Supreme Court, however, found sufficient rational support for the 
FCC's conclusions to uphold the Commission's determination 
that the public interest is best served by preserving existing 
newspaper-broadcast combinations except in the "egregious" 
cases of one-newspaper, one-broadcast communities. ld9 The FCC 
gave extensive consideration to a variety of public interest factors 
relative to diversity of ownership, including the absence of facts 
showing abuse from newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership, the 
trend toward decreased cross-ownership, the impact of diversity 
of ownership on message pluralism, the benefits of local owner- 
ship and management, and the potential disruption to private 
interests and public service. In view of the fact that diversity of 
ownership has never been considered the overriding element in 
determining the public interest, the Commission rationally con- 
cluded that it should not be given "controlling weight."lJO 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RULE PROHIBITING CO-LOCATED CROSS - 
OWNERSHIP 
A. Benefits of the Rule 
The FCC rule as approved by the Supreme Court restores 
certainty to a troubled area of broadcast regulation. Media own- 
ers had often complained of the inability to predict the impact 
of the diversification-of-ownership factor in licensing proceed- 
ings.lJ1 The rule, however, now clearly identifies those owners to 
be divested. To preserve this certainty, diversity should not be 
considered a controlling factor in denying license renewal.lJ2 The 
Supreme Court wisely recognized, and thereby assured those 
owners not divested under the rule, that "diversification of own- 
ership will be a relevant but somewhat secondary factor" in re- 
newal proceedings. lJ3 
Furthermore, because diversity will be controlled by rule, 
those owners to be divested should not suffer substantial eco- 
149. 98 S. Ct. a t  2121-22. 
150. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1069. 
151. See 1977 Broadcast Renewal Policies, supra note 64, a t  19380. 
152. Both the Commission and the D.C. Circuit prefer rulemaking. See, e.g., Stone 
v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). The FCC's position is further apparent from its recent recommendation that com- 
parative license hearings to select between two or more applicants be abolished. 1977 
Broadcast Renewal Policies, supra note 64, a t  19383. Moreover, had Congress been suc- 
cessful in its attempts to enact legislation precluding a comparative hearing if an incum- 
bent could show substantial performance, see notes 58, 63 supra, it would have effectively 
barred diversification from being considered in an adjudicatory procedure. 
153. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S. Ct. at  2119. 
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nomic loss from divestiture. Under the rule divested owners can 
sell their licenses to the highest bidder,lJ4 subject to routine ap- 
proval by the Commission. Had diversity been made a determi- 
native factor in a license proceeding denying renewal, however, 
deposed licensees could not have sold their licenses. Their license 
equity would have been entirely lost, not as a result of a failure 
to achieve a certain standard of broadcast quality, but because 
the Commission decided they controlled too much media in the 
same community. lJ5 
A rule, regardless of whether it requires limited or across-the- 
board divestiture, also avoids the extensive time and delay inher- 
ent in ad hoc consideration of diversity. Some adjudication, how- 
ever, may still be necessary if parties marshal sufficient evidence 
to merit waiver of the general ownership restrictionlJ6 since the 
FCC appears unwilling to grant waiver without a hearing.lJ7 
B. Allocation of the Burden of Proof 
Because available data pertinent to the decision in NCCB 
was inconclusive, the allocation of the "burden of proof [should] 
generally determine the outcome in the tug-of-war between the 
media and the 'public interest.' The FCC's ruling, sustained 
by the Supreme Court, places the burden of proof on those desir- 
ing cross-ownership only if certain policy considerations indicate 
that extraordinary emphasis can be given diversity. 
For example, the Commission rationally concluded that di- 
versified ownership is more desirable when it can be achieved 
without disruption.lJ9 Even though the benefits of diversity are 
speculative, prohibiting the future acquisition or transfer of 
newspaper-broadcast combinations in the same community is 
appropriate because it presents no risk of disruption harmful to 
local ownership or existing broadcast service. In light of these 
other policy considerations, those desiring to acquire newspaper- 
- 
154. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1085. 
155. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.35 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
156. The waiver criteria are broad enough that media interests may often successfully 
challenge the general rule. Mills, supra note 143, a t  1248-49. 
157. BROADCASTING, Aug. 4, 1975, a t  23. 
158. Leuchter, supra note 83, a t  369; see W. BAER, H. GELLER & J. GRUNDFEST, 
NEWSPAPER-TELEVISION TATION CROSS-OWNERSIP: OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL ACTION 30 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL ACTION]. 
159. Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules 
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 53 
F.C.C.2d 589, 592 (1975). 
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broadcast combinations in the future must shoulder the burden 
of showing that a potential newspaper-broadcast combination 
should be exempt from the prohibition of cross-ownership. 
Similarly, diversity is a more compelling consideration in 
serious cases of media monopolization. In situations where one 
party owns the only broadcast station and the only daily newspa- 
per in a community, that party must demonstrate how the mo- 
nopoly serves the overall public interest. Divestiture can only be 
avoided through temporary or permanent waiver if the party can 
show that (1) the station or newspaper cannot be sold for its 
estimated value, (2) divestiture of one of the two facilities would 
force the other out of business, or (3) the public interest is better 
served by allowing the combination's continued existence.lM 
In situations where the concentration of ownership is not as 
significant and there exists no evidence of abuse arising from 
newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership, the presumption would be 
in the media owners' favor, requiring the government to show 
harm to the public interest in order to force divestiture? Al- 
though the FCC has the right to regulate media ownership, a 
policy favoring freedom from government intervention should 
control where sufficient intermedia competition exists and no 
abuses are foundF2 This is consistent with past FCC multiple 
ownership rules ordering divestiture, which have grandfathered 
existing media combinations in the absence of abuse or poten- 
tially harmful media concentration,ld3 leaving the government 
with the burden of showing that a particular media concentration 
harms the public interest and should be broken up. 
The FCC's ruling is rational and was appropriately upheld 
by the Supreme Court. The remainder of this Comment, however, 
will recommend possible future modifications of the ruling based 
160. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1085. The court of appeals com- 
mented favorably upon the Commission's waiver rules. 555 F.2d at 966 & n.112. 
161. In W. BAER, supra note 79, perhaps the most comprehensive and unbiased of the 
studies, it is noted that across-the-board regulatory prohibitions generally require sub- 
stantial case evidence or enough samples with matched controls to determine that the 
conduct to be prohibited is representative of the entire set of parties to be regulated. Here, 
the "body of case evidence has not shown that group or cross-media owners influence their 
media outlets or otherwise behave differently from other media owners." Id. a t  143. An- 
other study concluded that only a limited divestiture order is appropriate. OP~ONS FOR 
FEDERAL ACTION, supra note 158, a t  39-42. Contra, Leuchter, supra note 83, a t  370. 
162. Mills, supra note 143, at 1240-41. 
163. See notes 6, 65-71 and accompanying text supra. 
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upon a finer balance between diversity of ownership and other 
public interest factors. In addition, alternative means will be sug- 
gested for promoting diversity of ideas without divestiture. 
A. Modifications to the FCC's Divestiture Rule 
Although the Commission was correct in limiting divestiture 
to the most egregious cases, more consideration should be given 
to the method of determining which combinations should be di- 
vested. A study made after the FCC ruling showed that location 
of the station studio had a greater impact on coverage of local 
issues than broadcast contours or wave reach. In light of the 
Supreme Court's recognition that local control and programming 
are factors of some significance,lB4 the Commission should con- 
sider the study's recommendation that newspaper-broadcast 
cross-ownership be eliminated on the basis of broadcast studio 
location rather than wave reach.lB5 
Because UHF-TV and radio stations are generally weaker in 
influence than both VHF-TV and newspapers,16"hey are less 
likely to dominate a community's media market and should thus 
be less subject to divestiture. This argument applies particularly 
to radio because research indicates that the public looks to televi- 
sion and newspapers for its news and information on public af- 
fairs, while "[olther broadcast services and other printed publi- 
cations are substantially less significant in this respect?" Thus 
a radio or UHF station subject to divestiture under the FCC rule 
should be allowed a waiver under relaxed standards since such 
broadcast services do not have a significant impact on the appli- 
cable media market.IBg 
B. Alternative Means of Promoting Diversity of Ideas 
I .  Petitions to deny without a Sherman Act violation 
The Commission appropriately grandfathered most 
164. See 98 S. Ct. a t  2119. 
165. W. GORMLEY, supra note 11, a t  232-41. Thirty-nine combinations would be unaf- 
fected if newspaper-television cross-ownerships were divested in cities served by only one 
or two local stations. Id. a t  240. 
166. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1063. 
167. First Report and Order, supra note 6, a t  344. The Roper study showed that 59% 
of the people surveyed depend on television, with newspapers a cl&e second, and other 
media far behind. Id. 
168. See OFTIONS FOR FEDERAL ACTION, supra note 158, a t  38 n.1. In its order the FCC 
granted two waivers without a specific request. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, 
a t  1085. The Commission's discussion indicates an inclination to grant waiver if a radio 
or UHF station is involved. See id.. 
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newspaper-broadcast combinations, but may have erred in its 
refusal to consider petitions to deny these combinations a license 
renewal except upon a showing of possible Sherman Act viola- 
tions.lg9 This leaves too onerous a burden for the Commission 
itself and for other parties desiring to obtain a broadcast license. 
Although divestiture should be limited in the absence of misuse 
by cross-owned media, the Commission and outside parties 
should be able to expose unduly restrictive news and program- 
ming policies in an adjudicatory hearing even though they do not 
constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.170 The FCC has re- 
quired monopolies to divest "where the circumstances present a 
spectre of specific abuse . . . or the great likelihood thereof,"171 
and should continue this policy by requiring hearings on petitions 
to deny licensing that present substantial evidence of abuse, even 
though an antitrust violation does not exist. Because antitrust 
actions are lengthy and only marginally effective in combating 
harmful concentration, such a rule could accelerate elimination 
of media misuse. If more than a mere allegation of monopolistic 
misuse is shown, the cross-owner should be subject to the burden 
imposed by an adjudicatory hearing on the matter. 
2. Rules requiring operational separation 
In establishing media ownership policy, the ultimate goal is 
a marketplace containing a substantial number of differing ideas. 
A broad selection of ideas would more assuredly exist through 
rules requiring the operational separation of commonly owned 
newspaper-broadcast combinations, rather than through divesti- 
ture rules that only indirectly affect message pluralism and at  the 
same time reduce local ownership and interrupt public service. 
Although the Commission commended conscientious joint owners 
for their efforts to assure operational separation, it did not require 
grandfathered combinations to be operationally separate."' One 
169. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits "monopolization" if a "censurable act" 
created or maintained the monopoly. It  would be difficult to argue that the filing of an 
original license or a license renewal constitutes a censurable act, especially when the 
license or renewal has been granted by a government agency. S. Barnett, Cross-Ownership 
of Mass Media in the Same City: A Report to the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation, 
A Critique of, and Supplement to, the Prospective Reports of the Rand Corporation 4 
(Sept. 23, 1974). 
170. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1110 (Hooks, Commissioner, concur- 
ring in part, dissenting in part). 
171. Id. See, e.g., Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chroni- 
cle Broadcasting Co., 17 F.C.C.2d 245, modified, 18 F.C.C.2d 120 (1969). 
172. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, a t  1089. However, Commissioners 
Quello and Hooks urge the policy's adoption. Id. at 1112 (concurring statements). 
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party urged the FCC to adopt a rule mandating that commonly 
owned newspapers and broadcast stations maintain separate ad- 
vertising sales staffs, separate editorial and reportorial personnel, 
and fair program listings for all television stations, while avoiding 
combination rates and discriminatory advertising rates for adver- 
tisers who use competitive media.ln Such a rule should be pro- 
mulgated by either the FCC or Congress174 with the additional 
stipulation that news staffs conduct entirely independent re- 
search and make no special arrangements to share completed 
stories. 175 
Allegations that a broadcast licensee is violating these rules 
may best be made in petitions to deny license grants or renewals. 
The Commission should be able to challenge a cross-owner's li- 
cense at any time if substantial evidence exists showing practices 
that may be violative of these proposed standards. This policy 
could negate any adverse consequences of cross-ownership and 
forestall government intervention through across-the-board di- 
vestiture without being construed as a restriction on speech or 
~ 0 n t e n t . l ~ ~  Furthermore, the rules would not create the unneces- 
sary disruption, reduced local ownership, and economic disloca- 
tion that would likely result if strict divestiture were mandated. 
Licensees could anticipate the bases for potential challenges to 
license renewal, and would naturally strive to meet well-defined 
minimum standards.177 Should cross-owners violate these rules, 
they could then be expected to shoulder the burden of defending 
against a petition to deny licensing. 
3. Other means 
Diversity of ideas can be encouraged without denigration of 
other public interest concerns through various means not already 
discussed. FCC regulations are appropriate when needed to pre- 
vent harm to a substantial public or governmental interest, but 
the restriction should be no greater than required to protect that 
173. Id. at 1112 (quoting proposal of Marcus Cohn embodied in letter from Marcus 
Cohn to the Broadcast Bureau (July 26, 1974)). 
174. The Commission is presently considering regulations treating combination rat.es 
and joint sales practice. Second Report and Order, supra note 2, at 1089 n.49. 
175. Cf. note 106 supra (news story overlap among cross-owned facilities in part 
caused by sharing of employees and news stories). 
176. The rules would only assure a certain method of conduct without rest.rict.ing 
content in violation of the first amendment. 
177. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.35 (D. C. 
Cir. 1971). 
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interest.178 Congress could further subsidize development of UHF 
and cable television systems179 or institute rules encouraging tech- 
nological advances in other ways.laO Broadcasters, as public trus- 
tees, could be required to lease air time, just as cable television 
operators must provide an "access" channel. 181 Increased enforce- 
ment of the fairness doctrine and equal time provisions could 
promote diversity of ideas without requiring the separation of co- 
located newspaper-broadcast combinations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress created the FCC to regulate broadcast media in 
order to promote the best practicable service to the community 
with due regard to media owners' first amendment rights. The 
courts, consequently, may not intervene unless the administra- 
tive decision is arbitrary. In elaborating on the Supreme Court's 
decision in NCCB, this Comment shows that the FCC and the 
courts have never accorded diversity of ownership controlling 
weight in broadcast licensing procedures, and media ownership 
rules have only required divestiture upon a showing of monopolis- 
tic abuse or serious concentration of ownership. Furthermore, 
because the broadcast spectrum can be expanded through tech- 
nology and since the total number of newspaper-broadcast com- 
binations is naturally decreasing, total divestiture seems a harsh 
remedy, especially if divestiture is only marginally effective in 
promoting the ultimate goal, diversity of ideas. Rules promoting 
diversity of control through divestiture should also be limited in 
consideration of their potential adverse effects on local owner- 
ship, continuity and stability of public service, and private eco- 
nomic viability. In consideration of these policies and the preced- 
ent against granting diversity controlling weight, the Commis- 
sion's limited divestiture order was rationally supported, and 
hence correctly sustained by the Supreme Court. The best regula- 
tory approach to common ownership of newspaper and broadcast 
media in the same community is a rule that requires separation 
178. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 47-48 (1977). 
179. OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL ACTIONS, supra note 158, at 30 n.1. The "creation of addi- 
tional types and methods of broadcasting is our best hope for more representative pro- 
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subscription TV." Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HAW. 
L. REV. 1693, 1700 (1969). 
180. Cf. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (Burger, C. 
J . ,  concurring) (arguing that the advent of cable television calls for a congressional reex- 
amination of the Communications Act). 
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MEDIA DIVERSITY AND DIVESTITURE 
of only those combinations that represent serious local monopo- 
lies or clearly misuse their media concentration posture. Because 
of divestiture's detrimental impact, operational separation, tech- 
nological advances, and other alternatives should be encouraged 
as more direct means of promulgating a marketplace of diverse 
ideas. 
Richard W. Sheffield 
